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A COMMENT: KAYE AND PLAIA ON SECTION 337-
PRICING JURISDICTION
Edward R. Easton and Jeffrey M. Lang*
In the Spring 1977 issue of the International Trade Law
Journal,' Messrs. Kaye and Plaia presented an analysis of the
jurisdiction of the United States International Trade Commission
(ITC) over matters concerning the pricing of articles imported into
the United States under the provisions of section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended. 2 In their analysis, Kaye and Plaia
* Attorney-Advisers, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade
Commission. The views expressed in this Comment are entirely personal, and do
not put forth the official policy of any agency of the United States. This Comment
is not written on behalf of nor approved in advance by the U.S. International
Trade Commission or any member or officer of the Commission.
1. 2 INT'L TRADE L.J. 1 (1977).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). The jurisdictional provisions of the statute are set
out in subsection (a):
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or
agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially
injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States,
or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to restrain
or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are declared
unlawful, ...
The boundaries of this jurisdiction have yet to be firmly established by the ITC.
The Commission has interpreted the language "or in their sale" as not requiring a
nexus between importation of merchandise and the commission of an unfair act
even after the merchandise has been withdrawn from customs for consumption.
See Commission Opinion, In the Matter of Convertible Game Tables and
Components Thereof, Investigation Docket No. 337-TA-2 (December 1974), at 19;
Commission Opinion, In the Matter of Certain Electronic Audio and Related
Equipment, Investigation Docket No. 337-TA-7 (April 1976), at 29.
In its annual report for 1923, the agency suggested that "the statute would
be made somewhat more explicit if the words 'exporter' and 'sell for export' were
inserted in subsection (a).... " Seventh Annual Report of the Tariff Commission
(Washington, D.C. 1923), at 41. Resolving the ambiguity in the use of the term Sale
in favor of the meaning of a sale for export to the United States is consistent with
the concept of tendency or incipiency in subsection (a). Compare, Federal Trade
Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). Although, the Commission has not
explicitly relied on this kind of interpretation in making a statutory determination
an order by an administrative law judge held that the agency should proceed with
an investigation before an actual importation has taken place if high cost durable
goods are involved, see, In the Matter of certain Machinery Centers with
Automatic Tool Changers, Investigation Docket No. 337-TA-34 (order of August
10, 1977).
(359)
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suggested that on its face section 337 overlaps the antidumping
acts of 19163 and 1921, 4 the countervailing duty statute,5 the
3. The first United States law directed at dumping was the Revenue Act of
1916, Pub. L No. 271, 39 Stat. 756 (1916). Under "Title VIII, Unfair Competition,"
Sections 800 and 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916 provide for suit in a district court
and treble damages and criminal sanctions if the defendant is found guilty of the
misdemeanor of importing or selling imported articles at a price substantially less
than the "actual market value" or "wholesale price" of such articles in the
principal markets of the country of their production or of other foreign countries to
which they are common exported, if "such act or acts be done with the intent of
destroying or injuring an industry in the United States .... or of restraining or
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United
States."
Both the language of the 1916 Act and the remedies it provided reflect the
provisions of Section 2 of the 1914 Clayton Act. In a letter to the New York Times
(July 14, 1916), Assistant Attorney General Samuel J. Graham described the 1916
Act as follows-
Any antidumping provision is not a matter of taxation, or strictly speaking,
tariff. It is a power exercised under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
and not under the Taxing Clause. Its purpose should be to prevent unfair
competition. Just as we have said to our own people by the Clayton Act that
they should not indulge in unfair competition, so we propose to say the same to
foreigners.
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 251
(E.D. Pa. 1975), the court held that certain provisions of the statute are not
unconstitutionally vague. Among the provisions challenged in the Zenith Radio
Corp. case were the terms "actual market value or wholesale price." The court
found that the entire phrase was a part of the customs law of the United States at
the time the 1916 law was enacted. 402 F. Supp. at 257. "Actual market value" was
defined in the Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, § III, R, 38 Stat. 114, as follows:
that such actual market value shall be held to be the price at which such
merchandise is freely offered for sale to all purchasers in (the principal
markets of the country from whence exported), in the usual wholesale
quantities, and the price which the seller, shipper, or owner would have
received, and was willing to receive, for such merchandise when sold in the
ordinary course of trade in the usual wholesale quantities, including the value
of all cartons, cases, crates, boxes, sacks, casks, barrels, hogsheads, bottles,
jars, demijohns, carboys, and other containers or coverings, whether holding
liquids or solids, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing
the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United
States....
The court did not discuss the term "wholesale price" other than to remark that the
term ". . . is surely familiar to the astute businessmen who are officers of
defendant corporations." 402 F. Supp. at 257.
4. The Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970), et seq.,
provides, roughly, that when a foreign company sells merchandise in the United
States for less than in its home market and such U.S. sales are injurious to a U.S.
industry, the Treasury Department shall assess antidumping duties to countervail
the margin of dumping, or margin of underselling from the home market price.
Certain adjustments are made for differences in the "circumstances of sale." See
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Sherman,6 the Clayton 7 and the Robinson-Patman Acts,8 and
attempted to distinguish section 337 by an historical analysis of
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, Vol. 1,
Antidumping Duties, Papers submitted to the Commission on International Trade
and Investment Policy (Washington, D.C., July 1971), 395.
Socialist countries have been involved disproportionately in antidumping
cases in terms of the amount of their trade with the United States. DeJong, The
Significance of Dumping in International Trade, 2 J.W.T.L. 162, 182 (1968). The
Antidumping Act has been applied to products of State-controlled economies. See
Anthony, The American Response to Dumping from Capitalist and Socialist
Economies, 54 CORNELL L REv. 159 (1969). Price comparisons, in such cases, are
made on the basis of products sold in a non-State controlled economy or on the
basis of the constructed value of similar merchandise in the non-State controlled
economy, 19 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1975).
5. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 303, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975). The
United States countervailing duty statute is broader in scope than the Antidump-
ing Act, 1921. Although it has only been invoked against government subsidies, its
jurisdiction encompasses private business organizations. However, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATr], Article VI, 5, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, provides that no contracting party (i.e., member-signatory)
shall subject imports to both antidumping and countervailing duties to remedy the
same situation. The GATT is an executive agreement.
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
7. Section 2 of the Clayton Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 212, 38 Stat. 730, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
Price discrimination in the primury line of competition - competitors of
the seller - usually involves two geographic markets. Concern with the primary
line of competition was the purpose of the enactment of Section 2 of the Clayton
Act. The Judiciary Committee described Section 2 in the following terms:
Section 2 of the bill is intended to prevent unfair discriminations. It is
expressly designed with the view of correcting and forbidding a common and
widespread and unfair trade practice whereby certain great corporations...
have heretofore endeavored to destroy competition and render unprofitable the
business of competitors by selling their goods - at a less price in the particular
communities where their rivals are engaged in business than at other places
throughout the country.
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1914). In geographic price discrimination
cases, a discriminator relies, presumably, upon a very strong position in one
market to subsidize his predatory pricing in a second market to weaken or
eliminate local competitors. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914).
8. Pub. L. No. 550, 52 Stat. 446 (1938). The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted
largely in reaction to the ascent of chain stores. The size of the chains gave them
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the enforcement of the latter statute. They also suggested that the
ITC establish standards for gauging unfair price competition in
the experience of the courts and the Federal Trade Commission
with sections 2 and 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.
This comment will focus on three areas of disagreement with
the treatment of these subjects in the Kaye and Plaia article. First,
recent events seriously weaken any argument that the enforce-
ment history of section 337 is a test of the scope of the ITC's
section 337 jurisdiction. The Trade Act of 19749 not only made
substantive amendments to section 337, but changed the nature of
the ITC's legislative mandate. Second, it would be difficult to do
worse than to use past Robinson-Patman practice as a standard
for regulation under section 337. We suggest that the ITC develop
standards through market analyses of the impact of alleged
unfair pricing. This was not done in the cases concerning
enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act cited in the Kaye and
Plaia article. 0 Finally, the Kaye and Plaia article suggests that in
the foreseeable future, the ITC and the executive departments will
focus their energies on overlapping agency and court jurisdictions
under the various statutes affecting pricing competition. In our
view, the primary issue will be instead, the negotiation of
international agreements concerning fair pricing competition.
Government export subsidization is at the root of most pricing
problems in international trade. The ITC can participate in
negotiating such agreements and can exercise its section 337
jurisdiction accordingly.
I. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
It appears that Kaye and Plaia want to resolve the alleged
jurisdictional overlappings of the ITC's jurisdiction under section
bargaining power to exact price concessions from suppliers which the suppliers
would not grant to other purchasers. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936); and S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). Although the Robinson-
Patman amendment of Section 2 was concerned with the secondary line of
competition, or the effect of price discrimination on competition between a favored
buyer and the competitors of the favored buyer, the Clayton Act provisions
concerning the primary line of competition were kept in the amended law.
9. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, (January 3, 1975).
10. Generally, the courts have not analyzed the conditions in the marketplace
in which the alleged price discriminations occurred. They have been more
concerned with injury to individual firms than the "impairment of competitive
forces in the market." Note, Meeting Competition under the Robinson-Patman Act,
90 HARV. L. REv. 1476, 1482 (1977).
362
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337 and the Treasury Department's authority under both the
Antidumping Act, 1921, and the countervailing duty statute. By
its own terms, section 337 provides:
Whenever, in the course of an investigation under this
section, the Commission has reason to believe, based on
information before it, that the matter may come within the
purview of section [303] ... or of the Antidumping Act, 1921,
it shall promptly notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that
such action may be taken as is otherwise authorized by such
section and such Act."
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (1975). Apparently this language was taken from that
in subsection 201(b)(6) of the Trade Act of 1974, which provides:
In the course of any proceeding under this subsection, the Commission
shall investigate any factors which in its judgment may be contributing to
increased imports of the article under investigation; and, whenever in the
course of its investigation the Commission has reason to believe that the
increased imports are attributable in part to circumstances which come within
the purview of the Antidumping Act, 1921, section 303 or 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, or other remedial provisions of law, the Commission shall promptly
notify the appropriate agency so that such action may be taken as is otherwise
authorized by such provisions of law.
It has never been suggested that the provisions of subsection 201(b)(6) operate in a
manner which would limit either the ITC's authority to conduct investigations
under or to reach determinations appropriate to section 201. See Commission
Memorandum Opinion, In the Matter of Certain Color Television Receiving Sets,
Investigation Docket No. 337-TA-23 (December 1976), at 10-11. The Commission
recently took this position when it enacted a section of its Rules of Practice and
Procedure implementing both section 337 and section 201(b)(6). It referred to both
statutes as "notification" provisions, and said,
Two commenters suggest that if the Commission has reason to believe that
the subject matter of a Commission investigation falls within a statute that is
under another agency's jurisdiction, the Commission should stop (or not start,
as the case may be) its investigation.
The Commission has decided not to accept [this] suggestion. Neither of the
statutory 'notification' provisions requires cessation of Commission activity in
any investigation [citing the order of December 20, 1976, denying motions to
dismiss in Certain Color Television Receivers, Inventory No. 337-TA-23, and
the decision in Melco Sales, Inc. v. ITC, et al., Civil Action No. 76-1932
(D.D.C., November 9, 1976)]. These provisions, sections 201(b)(6) and 337(b)(3),
require only notification. In a proper case the Commission is free to suspend a
section 337 investigation (see sec. 337(b)(1)), but suspension should not be, and
is not, required, nor should it be mentioned in this rule.
42 Fed. Reg. 16775 (1977). The rule, which is too long to quote here, appears at 19
C.F.R. 201.4(d) (1977). It essentially provides a procedure for determining whether
it is appropriate in any given case to notify another agency of matters or
circumstances that "may come within the purview of another remedial provision of
law not the basis of such investigation .. "
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In developing alternative postures which the ITC might adopt in
order to give effect to the provisions of section 337(b)(3), Kaye and
Plaia examine the types of unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts which have been investigated by the ITC under both
section 337 and its predecessor statute. 12 After an elaborate
analysis of these investigations they conclude that the ITC has
had a long-established administrative practice of interpreting
section 337 as not requiring it to conduct investigations petitioned
on the basis of unfairness in pricing. This conclusion, when
coupled with the language of section 337(b)(3) and the authority of
the ITC under designated circumstances to suspend its investiga-
tions under section 337,13 led Kaye and Plaia to the further
conclusion that the statute itself was ambiguous, in turn allowing
12. Section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L No. 318, 42 Stat. 858, in effect
from 1922 to 1930, provided that the Commission was to investigate alleged
violations of the Section, and was to make findings and recommendations which
were appealable to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and from there by
way of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Upon completion of this procedure, the
record was to be transmitted to the President, who, if he was satisfied that the Act
had been violated, could levy an additional duty of 10 to 50 percent ad valorem, or
could impose an embargo (exclusion order) on the goods being imported in
violation of the Act. Few changes were made in Section 316 when it became
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The House eliminated the Presidential
authority to impose penalty duties, H.R. REP. No. 7, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 166
(1929), and the Senate eliminated the provision for review by the Supreme Court, S.
REP. No. 37, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1929).
13. Subsection 337(b)(1), in part, provides:
The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on
complaint under oath or upon its initiative. Upon commencing any such
investigation, the Commission shall publish notice thereof in the Federal
Register. The Commission shall conclude any such investigation, and make its
determination under this section, at the earliest practicable time, but not later
than one year (18 months in more complicated cases) after the date of
publication of notice of such investigation. The Commission shall publish in
the Federal Register its reasons for designating any investigation as a more
complicated investigation. For purposes of the one-year and 18-month periods
prescribed by this subsection, there shall be excluded any period of time during
which such investigation is suspended because of proceedings in a court or
agency of the United States involving similar questions concerning the subject
matter of such investigation.
The suspension provision does not relieve the Commission from the
requirement in subsection 337(c) that the agency shall determine whether there is a
violation of section 337 in each investigation conducted under its authority. The
agency can take official notice of the effect of any judicial or administrative action
taken by the court or other agency when rendering its own determination. See
infra note 26 and subject text, and supra note 11.
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a construction of legislative intent.14 However, the legislative
history of section 337(b)(3) provides unambiguously that:
Section 337(b)(3), as amended by this bill, would provide
that the Commission, when it has reason to believe based on
information available to it that the subject matter of an
investigation it is conducting may come within the purview
of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or of the Antidumping
Act, 1921, shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that
such action may be taken as is otherwise authorized by
section 303 of the Antidumping Act. It is expected that the
Commission's practice of not investigating matters clearly
within the purview of either section 303 or the Antidumping
Act will continue.' 5
Kaye and Plaia conclude from this analysis that the ITC is
authorized to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over matters alleging
unfair pricing. They reason that the provisions of subsection
337(b)(3) can be read to "carve-out" pricing matters from the
jurisdictional provisions of subsection 337(a).
We disagree. We believe a reading of section 337 in context
with the other provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 - which revised
much of the organic statutes of the Commission - shows that the
Commission, rather than being deprived of jurisdiction over
pricing matters, was ordered to establish any and all standards
for commercial conduct in the import trade of the United States,
including pricing policy.
Prior to the Trade Act of 1974, the Commission merely
assisted the President in determining when violations of the
statute existed. The statutory authority to assist the President
extended to fact-finding and was merely advisory. 16 A violation
had to be established to the satisfaction of the President and the
Commission carried that burden. Due to enforcement problems in
14. There is no compelling reason to accept the proposition that subsections
337(b)(1)-(3) are ambiguous. See infra note 27. Administrative practice and
legislative history are only resorted to when the language of the statute is unclear.
15. S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1974).
16. Eventually, the advisory nature of the Commission's findings cast doubt
on the constitutional requirements that there be a "case or controversy" for a
contest to be justiciable. In Glidden Company v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the
Supreme Court reviewed the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 211, enacted in 1958, which
declared the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) to be an
Article III or constitutional court. In considering the jurisdiction of the CCPA, the
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attempts to remedy unfair competition from abroad, including the
problems involved in obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign
companies, the statute provided for an in rem jurisdiction over
imported articles. The remedy for violation of the statute appeared
to be limited to an order subjecting offensive merchandise to
exclusion from entry into domestic commerce, 17 except where an
Supreme Court considered the provision in section 337 authorizing appeals from
Commission findings of violations and recommendations that the President issue
exclusion orders:
The jurisdictional [statute] in issue, § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ...
appear[s] to subject the decisions called for . . . to an extrajudicial revisory
authority incompatible with the limitations upon judicial power this Court has
drawn from Article III.... It does not follow, however, from the invalidity,
actual or potential, of [this] . . . jurisdiction, that the . . . Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals must relinquish entitlement to recognition as an Article
III court.
370 U.S. at 582. From the decision in Glidden until the 1974 amendments it was
doubtful that the CCPA would entertain appeals from Commission findings under
section 337.
17. Commission recommendations that the President exclude articles never set
forth a nexus between the import and the importer. Whether exclusion orders were
intended to operate exclusively in rem was not clear from the terms of the statute.
The legislative history of the statutory predecessor of section 337 indicates that the
Senate may have intended a limited type of exclusion order which affected only
those importers found to practice unfair methods of competition or unfair acts:
That whenever the existence of any such unfair method or act shall be
established to the satisfaction of the President . . . he shall direct that such
articles [concerned in such unfair methods or acts] imported by any person
violating the provisions of this Act, shall be excluded from entry into the
United States, and upon information of such action by the President, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall, through the proper officers . . . refuse such
entry; and that the decision of the President shall be conclusive. [Emphasis
added]
Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 318, § 316(e), 42 Stat. 944.
The underlined portion of subsection (e) was added as an amendment on
the floor by the Senate during the debate on section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922.
During the course of that debate, Senator Lenroot stated:
[S]o, under the amendment now proposed, if one importer has indulged in
unfair competition, and a finding to that effect is sustained and reported to the
President, because one importer has been guilty of wrongdoing the President
may fix rates from 10 to 50 per cent ad valorem upon all merchandise, either of
that character or any different character.
MR. REED. Let me ask the Senator whether, in the case he has just put,
it would not be much wiser if we provided penalties to be visited upon the
particular importer who violated the proper practices, and reach it in that way,
instead of reaching it by excluding everybody?
MR. LENROOT. I think that is the way to reach it. The Senator from
Utah has just called my attention to one of the amendments which is intended
366
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appropriate bond was given in connection with a temporary
exclusion order. 18
The direction which the regulation of imports took under the
statute was unexpected. The Commission recommended an
exclusion order based upon the theory that infringement of a valid
U.S. patent was a violation of the act.19 The Court of Customs and
to be proposed, which will limit it to merchandise imported in violation of this
act. Do I understand from the Senator from Utah, then, that it will not be a
general rate imposed upon all merchandise but will be a rate imposed upon
merchandise imported by a given individual who is guilty of violation of the
act.
MR. SMOOT. That is all there is to it, Mr. President. The criticism the
Senator has just offered to the original paragraph is absolutely correct. Under
that, if there had been one violation the President could have imposed the
extra duty upon all importations, by any and every person, of that kind of
merchandise, and that is why the committee is going to offer this amendment.
MR. LENROOT. I am very frank to say that that greatly improves the
section.
Cong. Rec., August 11, 1922, at 11241-44.
Later during the course of the debate an amendment was offered to
subsection (e) to overcome the objection voiced by Senator Lenroot, which
amendment consisted of the insertion of the language underscored above. The
amendment was agreed to and the language was inserted in the law.
In the conference report which was issued when the Tariff Act of 1922 was
reported out by the conferees, the following statement was made:
Investigations of cases arising under this section are to be made by the
United States Tariff Commission and its findings are subject to review, on
questions of law, by the United States Court of Customs Appeals. The final
findings of the Commission are then transmitted to the President and he is
authorized, in case such unfair methods or acts are established to his
satisfaction, to impose additional duties upon merchandise imported in
violation of the act, and in extreme cases he is authorized to prohibit the
offending person from importing any merchandise into the United States.
[Emphasis added]
18. The amount of the bond was set by the Customs Service at the domestic
value of the merchandise. 19 C.F.R. 12.39(b) (1977). [This provision is still set out in
Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations although it is no longer appropriate.]
With the amendment of section 337 by the Trade Act of 1974, however, the
authority to establish the bond amount was transferred to the ITC. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(e), (g)(3) (1975). The bond is to be set in an amount which will offset the
competitive advantage resulting from unfair acts in the importation or sale of the
offensive articles. S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 198 (1974).
Where a permanent exclusion order is issued, the bond obligors, under the
supervision of customs officers, either export all of the offending merchandise to a
foreign country, destroy the merchandise, or present an appropriate license
permitting its entry, 19 C.F.R. 12.39(c) (1977).
19. In the Matter of Coilable Metal Rules and Holders, Investigation Docket
No. 337-8 (October 1935).
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Patent Appeals upheld the Commission's findings to the effect
that patent infringement was an unfair method of competition
and an unfair act.20 Subsequently the limited role of the
Commission and the inflexibility of the exclusion order resulted in
the great bulk of Commission investigations being concerned with
allegations of patent infringement.
In excluding infringing and unlicensed articles, an exclusion
order operates to promote compliance with the patent laws and to
allow the importation of licensed merchandise. 21 However,
exclusion of merchandise for an "antitrust type" of offense pre-
sented a remedy more harmful than the violation. A proceeding
aimed at promoting competition would result at best in an order
cutting off competition from certain imports.
The 1974 amendments to section 337 included a more flexible
remedy, cease and desist orders, as well as exclusion orders. This
amendment can only be appreciated when it is realized that all
Commission section 337 orders become, by virtue of the Trade Act
of 1974, final agency orders subject to a limited form of
Presidential "disapproval." Previously, the Presidential authority
had been plenary. Prior to the 1974 amendments, the President,
not the Commission, determined what conduct was a violation of
the statute. As amended by the 1974 Trade Act, subsection 337(c)
specifically authorizes the Commission to determine what is
unlawful conduct. The President can only veto an affirmative
order on "policy" grounds.
We submit that Congress decided that the proper division of
authority between the President and the ITC is that the
Commission establish the fair competition standards for importa-
tion of merchandise into the United States and that the President
may prevent the implementation of such standards only when
they conflict with national or foreign policy objectives, and then
only on a case-by-case basis.22 The Commission clearly has the
20. Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corporation, 39 F.2d 247 (1930), 17 C.C.P.A. 494,
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930).
21. See e.g., Commission Memorandum Opinion, In the Matter of Reclosable
Plastic Bags, Investigation Docket No. 337-TA-22 (January 1977), at 15.
22. See November 6, 1976, hearing transcript, Melco Sales, Inc. v. United
States International Trade Commission, et al., C.A. No. 76-1932:
Counsel for plaintiff:
Your honor, the question is whether the Court has jurisdiction to review the
actions of one of the Federal agencies which in this case not only exceed [sic]
its jurisdiction, but the State Department has represented in no uncertain
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authority and the responsibility to develop an interpretation of
statutory authority removing ambiguities from the pre-Trade Act
of 1974 history of instituting very few investigations resulting in
limited enforcement, i.e., selective findings and recommendations
transmitted to the President.23 In further support of this
interpretation of Congressional intent, we note the significant
"independence" of the ITC legislated in the Trade Act of 1974.24
terms that, 'continuation of the [ITC's] investigation will disrupt our vital
foreign relations .
The Court:
Does this court have jurisdiction to sit to enforce the pronouncements of
Secretary Kissinger?
The Court:
Fundamentally, aren't you challenging the right of the Commission to do what
the statute commands it to do, to make an investigation? Fundamentally, isn't
that what you're doing?
23. Gifford, Communication of Legal Standards, Policy Development, and
Effective Conduct Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 409, 424- 25 (1971). A similar
situation seems to exist with respect to economic regulation of foreign air carriers
and routes between points in the United States and points without. The U.S. Civil
Aeronautics Board is empowered by section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
to issue permits to foreign air carriers, 49 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1970), and in doing so it
takes into account, inter alia, "the public interest" and international agreements,
49 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1970) and 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970). Nevertheless, the issuance or
denial of such permits are "subject to the approval of the President," 49 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1970). Even though the scope of Presidential authority in foreign aviation is
greater than under section 337, there has never been any doubt that the economic
policy of foreign air transportation is made by the Board, subject to Presidential
approval. We will have occasion later to comment on the Board's experience under
this arrangement, which is now substantial. See infra note 62, subject text,
24. Professor Dixon has gauged the independence of agencies from the
Executive branch by cataloging limitations on their freedom from influence.
Limitations on independence include: Executive control of budget submissions;
centralization of litigation in the attorney general; centralized clearance of all
agency proposals for new legislation and comments on proposed congressional
legislation; the combination of presidential control over the chairmanship of most
commissioners with the chairman's control over the administration and staffing of
the commission; executive branch monitoring of agency requests for information;
public intervention by executive in adjudicative agency proceedings; personnel
policies of the Civil Service Commission; absence of limitations set forth in the
agencies' organic statutes on the president's power to remove members of the
agency; and, presidential delegation to independent commissions without explicit
statutory authority. Dixon, The Independent Commissions and Political. Responsi-
bility, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dixon.]
The Executive branch has no control over ITC budget submissions, 19
U.S.C. §2232 (1975), or ITC litigation, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §714, amending 19
U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). Requests for information in formal adjudicative proceedings
369
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Finally, the statute, as amended, is replete with language
which bars the exercise of ITC discretion to avoid exercising its
jurisdiction to determine what constitutes unfair methods of
competition and unfair acts in the import trade:
Subsection (b)(1) states that the Commission shall
investigate any alleged violation of section 337 on complaint
or upon its initiative;25
Subsection (c) states that the Commission shall deter-
mine, with respect to each investigation conducted under
section 337, whether or not there is a violation of section
337;26
Subsection (a), which makes unlawful injurious unfair
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States, states that the provisions of
section 337 are in addition to any other provision of law.
Against this background, it would seem that the provisions of
subsection (b)(3) - requiring the notification of the Secretary of
are exempt from Executive branch monitoring, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 409, and OMB
Circular No. A-40, February 10, 1976, section 9(c). Finally, Presidential control over
the chairmanship of the ITC is circumscribed, Pub. L. No. 95-106, § 2(a), 91 Stat.
867 (1977).
25. Prior to amendment by the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) provided
that "[t]o assist the President in making any decisions under this section the
Commission is authorized to investigate any alleged violation hereof on complaint
under oath or upon its initiative." The term "authorized" does not suggest that the
Commission shall investigate.
26. A recent decision of the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, however, may stand for the proposition that the Commission does not
have to take evidence on disputed facts where a complainant, in effect, elects to
nonsuit an investigation which had been initiated on the basis of its petition.
In Investigation Docket No. 337-TA-20, the complainant, Standard Oil
Company (SOHIO), filed a motion for an order granting SOHIO leave to dismiss
without prejudice, terminating the patent-based investigation. The motion was
challenged by respondents Rohm and Haas and the foreign producer on the
ground that they were entitled to an on-the-record adjudication of their affirmative
defenses to the allegations of patent infringement. The Commission dismissed the
investigation on the basis that complainant had conceded in its motion that any
alleged unfair method of competition or unfair act had not resulted in injury and,
therefore, the statute had not been violated.
In a consolidated appeal to the C.C.P.A., Rohm and Haas Company and
the foreign producer argued that they had been entitled to a determination, based
upon a hearing on-the-record, of whether or not there was a violation of section
337. In a per curiam decision the Court held that the Commission dismissal was
"with prejudice to SOHIO." See Rohm and Haas Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n and
Standard Oil Co. (SOHIO), 554 F.2d 462 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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the Treasury whenever matters come before the ITC that are also
within the purview of the Antidumping Act, 1921, or the
countervailing duty statute - are completely procedural in
nature. 2
7
Of course, the ITC is quite new to the area of regulation, as
distinguished from its traditional role as an advisor and fact-
finder. It will take time and experience to develop tools which best
carry out this new function. It may prove inefficient and
inconclusive to make such policy on a case-by-case basis, even if
adjudication is a necessary tool in enforcing the law.28 Devices
which could facilitate a break with the pre-Trade Act of 197.4
enforcement policies are the adoption of an advisory rulings
system and the promulgation of industry-wide trade regulation
rules - both efforts representing an agency commitment to
prescribe standards conforming to enforcement policy. 29 These
rulemaking devices would help to inform the public of the ITC's
thinking concerning the statute without the agency having to
adjudicate individual cases to do so. This is perhaps needed even
more at the ITC than elsewhere, where all complaints meeting the
formal requirements of the ITC's rules are instituted as investiga-
tions.30
27. We believe that subsection (b)(3) is supposed to operate in concert with
subsection (b)(1); i.e., if during the course of a section 337 proceeding the ITC has
reason to believe that matter before it comes within the purview of the
Antidumping Act, 1921, or the countervailing duty statute, the ITC may - in its
discretion - suspend the section 337 proceeding in accordance with the provisions
of subsection (b)(1), pending the outcome of any investigation the Department of
the Treasury may conduct.
In promulgating 19 C.F.R. 201.4 (Notification of Other Federal Agency of
Matter Within Its Jurisdiction), the Commission rejected suggestions - received in
the form of written comments on the rule as proposed - to the effect that in lieu of
"notification" the Commission either stop or not initiate, as appropriate, an
investigation into a matter which also fell within a statute under another agency's
jurisdiction. See supra note 11.
28. STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., Delay in the Regulatory Process, IV STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION
36-53 (COMM. PRINT 1977).
29. Dixon, supra note 24, at 431, n.84 and accompanying text.
30. Blumrosen, Toward Effective Administration of New Regulatory Statutes,
29 ADMIN. L. REV. (1977) 87, 113-114; STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON FEDERAL
REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM (Comm. Print 1976), at 66-72. The
Commission's policy, evidently based on the language of section 337(b)(1) that the
Commission "shall investigate," does not, however, bar peremptory motions.
Motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are regularly entertained after
institution as well as before, even though all the facts relating to such issues may
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II. ROBINSON-PATMAN IN RETREAT
Kaye and Plaia contend that the ITC has the "option" of
interpreting and implementing subsection 337(b)(3) as being
procedural in nature to avoid simultaneous and duplicative
investigations by both the ITC and the courts or other agencies.
The provisions in subsection 337(b)(3) would not therefore be
applicable if the contested pricing matter were being litigated only
before the ITC. In such cases Kaye and Plaia appear to suggest
that the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to investigations
conducted under the authority of section 337 as a "model" for
developing a body of law under the statute.31 This is puzzling. We
would submit that there is a trend away from the enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act and that it is a healthy one.32 To
resurrect discredited pronouncements under the Robinson-Patman
Act as a standard for adjudications of pricing fairness under
section 337 appears both unnecessary and undesirable. 33 More-
have been available before institution. See opinion of the presiding officer in
Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, Investigation Docket No. 337-TA-29,
March 23, 1977 (Prehearing Order No. 6).
31. Their discussion of predatory pricing is somewhat directionless. The
Supreme Court decision in Utah Pie v. Continental Baking, 386 U.S. 685 (1967), is
cited uncritically. The result in Utah Pie was that defendants, in attempting to
enter a geographic market demonstrated an intent to weaken plaintiff, the
dominant seller. This has been described by Professor Posner as an "example of
judicial ineptitude." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 194
(1976). Prohibiting market entry by means of a price reduction may inhibit entry
and prevent the introduction of competition. See Note, Competitive Injury Under
the Robinson-Patman Act, 74 HARV. L. REV., 1597, 1603, n.44 and text (1961).
The case of F & A Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.
Cal. 1951) is cited for the proposition that "cost accountancy has reached the
exactness of a science." The statement is absurd. The attribution of costs to
particular products is always arbitrary to some degree. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON COST JUSTIFICATION, REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (February
1956), at 22. Finally, the U.S. Justice Department's 1976 Report on the Robinson-
Patman Act is cited for the proposition that the act is unnecessary for prevention
of pricing predation. If Messrs. Kaye and Plaia agree with the department, what
was their reason for reciting the case law under section 2(a)?
32. The FTC has begun to investigate predatory conduct under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which is "a more flexible, potent and expeditiously
enforceable statute in every way than Robinson-Patman." Ward, Panel Discussion,
45 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 64 (1976). See also R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 31-34 (1976).
33. In discussing the injury standards of section 337 being applied to
individual competitors, one commentor observed that:
We have traveled this route before under the banner of Robinson-Patman.
Who among us cannot vividly recall the FTC and Supreme Court "soft
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over, recent section 337 cases involve allegations of unlawful
pricing for which Robinson-Patman is a particularly inapprop-
riate solution. These cases most frequently allege predatory
pricing, or prices that are in some sense too low, thus, the alleged
overlap of these cases and antidumping proceeding. However,
section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act which relates to unreasona-
bly low prices was in effect repealed some time ago by the
Supreme Court.34
Even section 2 of Robinson-Patman may have been repealed
in a similar fashion. In Certain Above-Ground Swimming Pools 35
the ITC adopted a portion of a recommended determination by the
presiding officer who heard that case, to the effect that section 2
does not reach discrimination in price as between import
transactions in the United States and other transactions that
occurred wholly in other countries. Moreover, the body of case law
developed under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is not
necessary for developing standards concerning price competition
in two or more geographic markets. The prohibitions in section 2
of the Sherman Act also reach anticompetitive price discrimina-
tion. As Professor Gellhorn has suggested, the prohibitions in
competition" decisions of the 1950's and 1960's which brought that statute in
open conflict with the Sherman Act? How the antitrust symposia and
literature of that period resounded with denunciations and calls for repeal!
Now that that trip is behind us, and Robinson-Patman enforcement has
become selective and its injury test broader, who would wish to repeat it under
a different banner?
LaRue, Section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act and Its Section 5 FTC Act Counterpart,
43 ANTITRUST L.J. 608, 615 (1975).
34. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, a criminal provision containing
penalties for its violation, did not amend the Clayton Act. In holding that a private
cause of action did not lie for practices forbidden only by § 3, the Supreme Court
noted that, "[t]he Department of Justice has never, so far as we have been able to
determine, brought proceedings under this provision, of § 3." Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Milk Co., 355 U.S. 373, 378 (1957). Writing for the dissenting justices in
a five to four opinion, Justice Douglas observed that "the statute [§ 3] has in effect
been repealed." Id. at 388 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35. ITC Publication 815 (April 1977) at 5. See Commission Opinion, In the
Matter of Certain Above-Ground Swimming Pools, Investigation Docket No.
337-TA-25. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., 402 F.
Supp. 244 (1975), which was cited by the presiding officer. This ruling was reached
in reliance on the enactment of antidumping legislation in 1916 and 1921
subsequent to enactment of the 1914 Clayton Act and also because neither
Congress nor the executive department and agencies charged with antitrust
enforcement were of the opinion that the 1914 act reached price discrimination
between national markets. Id. at 249.
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section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act are redundant. They
repeat the prohibitions of the Sherman Act in any antitrust policy
which does not discourage price competition. 36 The case law under
the Robinson-Patman Act fosters an atmosphere of resale price
maintenance for wholesalers. 37 The result of its enforcement has
been similar to that of the Fair Trade Laws - the elimination of
price competition.
In view of their having recited the similarities between section
337 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, it is
surprising that Kaye and Plaia did not advance the possible use of
section 5 as a model in the area of investigations of alleged price
discrimination, including predatory pricing. As one commentator
noted some time ago, the employment of section 5 for the
investigation and prosecution of price discrimination cases would
facilitate "a full-range inquiry and proof of imminent economic
effect, rather than continued administration and judicial juggling
with the verbal incongruities of the Patman Act."'38
Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act has assumed that
costs are the primary determinant of price39 and has tended to
attribute the cost-plus pricing typical of "regulated" industries to
firms competing in markets not serviced by regulated industries.40
Often factors such as the quality of competing goods, consumer
preferences and buying power, and the numbers and sizes of
competing firms, have not been taken into account.41 These
36. E. GE LLHORN, ANTrrRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 370 (1976). There is no
doubt that enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act has had anticompetitive
results. In a parade of horrors, Professor Liebeler cited instances where FTC
actions against quantity discounts reinforced price-fixing arrangements. Liebeler,
LET'S REPEAL IT [the Robinson-Patman Act], 45 ANTrrRUST L.J. 18, 30-31 (1976).
Another commentator has observed that the facts alleged in certain
"treble-damage suits charging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act... appear
sufficient to constitute a monopoly or monopolization attempt cognizable under § 2
of the Sherman Act." Austern, Difficult and Diffuse Decades: An Historical Plaint
About the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 897, 910 (1966).
37. The phrase "resale price maintenance program for wholesalers" is
attributed to William F. Baxter in hearings on Regulatory Reform before the
Domestic Council (1975). See Liebeler, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. at 43, n.69.
The relationships between below-cost sales prohibitions, and resale price
maintenance are explored in Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
175, 198-201 (1954).
38. 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 910. See also POSNER, supra note 32, at 35.
39. The act assumes this. Liebeler, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. at 41.
40. See Burck, The Myths and Realities of Corporate Pricing, FORTUNE, April,
1972, 85, 87.
41. See Note, supra note 31, at 1600.
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market factors are typical of those regularly taken into account by
the ITC in several of its statutory jurisdictions, under which it is
authorized to ascertain the impact of import competition on U.S.
industries in domestic markets.42 There would appear to be no
reason why section 337 cannot be applied in this realistic and
flexible way to administer pricing policy in the import trade.
III. EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND FAIRNESS IN COMPETITION
The real issue in the area of international price competition is
what is a trade distorting subsidy? Government export subsidies
distort competition in much the same way as the price discrimina-
tor who subsidizes low prices in one market with high prices in
another. The subsidized exporter and the predator capture sales
and gain market power at the expense of their competitors. They
could not have competed effectively in the market "but for" the
subsidy. 43
Domestic statutes designed to countervail export subsidies
date from the 1890's. At that time U.S. tariff levels were
intentionally protectionist and tariff provisions were designed to
prevent imports from causing domestic market disruptions.
Export subsidies were considered as a way of avoiding the
protection provided by the tariff.44 Countervailing duty laws were
therefore enacted for the express purpose of restoring the integrity
of the tariff where foreign subsidies would otherwise compensate
for the customs duty.
42. See 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (general investigations of import trade); 19
U.S.C. § 160 and § 1303 (1970) (determination of the existence of certain types of
injury to domestic industry under the Antidumping Act, 1921, and the countervail-
ing duty statute, respectively); and sections 201 and 406 of the Trade Act of 1974
(recommendations to the President regarding import relief).
43. Compare, Schwartz and Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting
International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831, 836-39 (1972); and Note, Meeting
Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 90 HAav. L. REV. 1476, 1477 (1977).
44. P. BIDWELL, THE INVISIBLE TARIFF 87 (1939). Prior to the current "Tokyo
Round" of negotiations in Geneva, several multilateral negotiations for the
exchange of tariff concessions were held under the auspices of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Geneva (1947); Annecy (1949); Torquay (1950-
1951); Geneva (1955-1956); Geneva (1961-1962); Geneva (1963-1967).
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As tariffs have been negotiated45 downward under the
auspices of the GATT and, "bound" at the negotiated rates,46 the
existence of a tariff is no longer considered as necessarily
adequate to protect domestic industries from significant market
disruption. Indeed, tariffs are becoming neither a source of
revenue nor an effective protectionist device.
Prior to the Trade Act of 1974, the countervailing duty statute
reached only dutiable imports and the provision dealing with
dutiable imports does not contain any injury requirement. 47
Section 331 of the Trade Act extended the law to reach duty-free
merchandise but also required that the ITC conduct the same
injury investigation with respect to duty-free articles under the
countervailing duty statute as it does with respect to articles sold
at "less than fair value" under the Antidumping Act, 1921.
48
Unlike the provisions of the Antidumping Act, 1921, however, the
countervailing duty statute does not contain any legislative
formula for determining what type of subsidy constitutes a
proscribed "bounty or grant." The administration of the statute
has led to a bewildering series of pronouncements on "bounties or
grants," especially with respect to the rebate of consumption or
sales taxes upon the export of a product.
The Department of the Treasury basically regards the
following types of taxes to constitute "bounties or grants" when
rebated upon exportation: (1) direct taxes; (2) overrebated indirect
taxes; and (3) indirect taxes where the tax collected has no
relationship to the product exported - as with taxes paid for
45. Prior to the current "Tokyo Round" of negotiations in Geneva, several
multilateral negotiations for the exchange of tariff concessions were held under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Geneva (1947); Annecy
(1949); Torquay (1950-1951); Geneva (1955-1956); Geneva (1961-1962); Geneva (1963-
1967).
46. Ernest H. Preeg has defined a binding as "A commitment that the rate of
duty on a product will not be increased or that no duty will be imposed on a duty-
free product." TRADERS AND DIPLOMATS 307 (1970).
47. GATT Article VI(6) prohibits the levying of countervailing duties in the
absence of a determination of injury to a domestic industry. The United States,
however, is exempted from this provision by the Protocol of Provisional
Application of the GATT, a "grandfather" clause applicable to existing legislation.
48. The statutory provision for the ITC investigation of the impact of duty-free
imported products was derived verbatim from the Antidumping Act, 1921. The
House Ways and Means Committee Report on the Trade Act stated that the injury
determination under the countervailing duty statute was ".... intended to have the
same meaning . . . as that under the antidumping act." HousE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS, TRADE REFORM AcT OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., 74 (1973).
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overhead expenses - even though it may have been shifted
forward on like products sold domestically.49 Domestic assistance
programs, too, have been the subject of countervailing duty
orders.5o
The recent decision of the Customs Court in Zenith Radio
Corporation v. United States5' and challenge to the European
value added tax export remissions 52 threatened disruptions to
international trade. The Customs Court decision and the chal-
lenge to the value added tax suggested that each article exported
from a country employing a system of "indirect" or consumption
taxes53 might have been vulnerable to the imposition of counter-
vailing duties. Such wholesale impositions of duties would have
precipitated foreign retaliation. The Zenith decision was over-
turned by the C.C.P.A., affirmed by the Supreme Court, which
appears to doom the challenge to the value added taxes as well.
54
The current state of the law consists of a "general interpreta-
tion of the statute on a case-by-case basis." 55 There is some sort of
49. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, Vol. 1, Countervailing Duties, Papers submitted to the
Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy (Washington, D.C.,
July 1971), 409-10.
50. X-Radial Belted Tires from Canada, T.D. 73-10, CUST. BULL. 24 (1973).
Canadian government assistance to the Michelin Tire Corp. to establish a plant in
Nova Scotia was held to constitute the payment of a bounty or grant on the ground
that 73 percent of the output of the plant was exported to the United States.
51. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977), rev'd
562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
52. U.S. Steel v. United States, No. 76-2-00456 (Cust. Ct., filed February 10,
1977).
53. The complement to the assumption that indirect (excise) taxes are
consumption taxes and that their rebate constitutes a subsidy is the assumption
that direct (income) taxes are not shifted to the consumer. The assumption may
have no merit. See K. DAM, THE GATr: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 214-16 (1970), and M. KRZYSANIAK AND R. MUSGRAVE, THE
SHIF rING OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAx (1963). It certainly lacks congressional
support. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., FOREIGN
TRADE: A SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES TO BE STUDIED BY THE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L
TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE (Comm. Print 1971), at 14; H.R. REP.
No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1973); S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1974). The failure of the Treasury Department to countervail the remission of the
value added tax on E.C. exports of steel led to the enactment of section 301(a)(3) of
the Trade Act, authorizing presidential retaliation under designated circumstan-
ces. See 119 CONG. REC. 40769 (1973), (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
54. Zenith v. United States, 46 U.S.L.W. 4752 (June 21, 1978).
55. Marks and Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 L. &
POL. INT'L Bus. 327, 348 (1975).
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consensus that not all subsidies ought to be countervailed against
but there is no agreed upon standard as to what practices
constitute "unfair" subsidies. Until very recently, the countervail-
ing duty statute has received little attention when contrasted with
that afforded the Antidumping Act, 1921. The failure to negotiate
a countervailing duty code along with the International Anti-
dumping Code56 during the multilateral trade negotiations ending
in 1967 is attributed to the smaller number of proceedings under
the statute. 57
Since 1968, however, the controversy over border tax adjust-
ments has kept the international subsidy issue in the limelight. In
1968 the GA1IT Ministers endorsed negotiation of a code on export
56. The International AntiDumping Code was negotiated in order to interpret
the provisions of Article VI of the GATT and to harmonize different national
antidumping procedures. See Rehm, Developments in the Law and Institutions of
International Economic Relations: The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 62
AM. J. INT'L L. 403 (1968). The authority for negotiating the Code was section
201(a)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which authorized the President to
proclaim a reduction of ".... any existing duty or other import restrictions;"
however, a statement in the Senate report accompanying the act stated that "....
laws not intended to be affected include the Antidumping Act.. . ." S. REP. No.
2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962). There was no similar restriction in the House
Report, H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1962).
Article 14 of the Code provided that the signatory parties would bring their
laws, regulations, and administrative procedures into conformity with its terms.
United States accession to the Code was accomplished by executive agreement -
implementation of its terms was left to the Treasury Department and the then
Tariff Commission (predecessor of the ITC) through their administrative decisions.
See Barcello, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade - The United States and the
International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 533-34 (1972).
In a report to the Senate, the Tariff Commission took the position that
standards of the Code were inconsistent with the determinations made under the
authority of the Antidumping Act, 1921, and that the administrative agencies
could implement the provisions of the code only if the 1921 act was amended. See
U.S. Tariff Commission, Report On Antidumping Code, reprinted in 114 CONG.
REc. 4061 (1968). In the Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, the Congress
provided that the Treasury Department and the Tariff Commission retain the
discretion to interpret the 1921 Act. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). There is no question of
the constitutional supremacy of the Renegotiation Amendments Act over the
executive agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF
THE UNrrED STATES § 145 (1965). Any conflict between the provisions of the 1921
Act and the Code are to be resolved in favor of the Act. The language of the
Renegotiation Amendments Act, however, left it to the discretion of the agencies to
interpret the 1921 Act.
57. K. Dam, supra note 53, at 178.
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subsidy practices and countervailing duties.58 The effort had
faltered until the current round of GATT negotiations5 9 Section
331(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 provides that, "[i]t is the sense of
the Congress that the President. . . seek through negotiations the
establishment of internationally agreed rules and procedures
governing the use of subsidies (and other export incentives) and
the application of countervailing duties." 60 The section also
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to refrain from ordering
the imposition of countervailing duties in designated circumstan-
ces where the imposition of the duties would also "be likely to
seriously jeopardize satisfactory completion of [such] negotia-
tions." The most far-reaching indication of conkressional support
for a code is the indication on the part of the House Committee on
Ways and Means that, "[t]he Committee assumes that it may be
necessary to further amend section 303 [the countervailing duty
statute] depending upon the outcome of these negotiations,
assuming that they terminate in an agreement acceptable to the
United States."61 The provisions for making necessary legislative
amendments to implement a subsidy code will prevent a
recurrence of the International Antidumping Code fiasco.6 2
Existing GATT provisions do not differentiate between
subsidies which adversely affect "international trade, and
therefore might be prohibited, and those subsidies which should
be offset only when their use causes injury." 63 Any agreement
negotiated as a part of the multilateral negotiations will most
likely implement the injury requirement in Article VI of the
GATT, especially as the European Community negotiating
position on subsidies has been to put a "priority on bringing the
U.S. into line on the question of injury."64 An amendment of the
countervailing duty law to provide for an injury test will most
likely follow the examples of the provision of the statute for duty-
58. H. MALMGREN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PEACEKEEPING IN PHASE II 104
(rev. ed. 1973).
59. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, Supp. I, at 10-21 (Comm. Print 1975).
60. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d) (1970).
61. H.R. REP. No. 571, supra note 48, at 76. See infra note 62.
62. Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 specifies expedited congressional
procedures for enactment of trade agreements into domestic law. See supra note 56.
63. Wolff, The U.S. Mandate for Trade Negotiations, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 549
(1976).
64. Marks and Malmgren, supra note 55.
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free imports and the bifurcated proceedings in the Antidumping
Act, 1921, placing the responsibility for such injury determina-
tions in the ITC.
The potential also exists for the ITC to make a contribution to
the negotiation of any codes on subsidies. By virtue of its new
status as regulator the ITC obviously has an interest in the
negotiation of a subsidies code in the current round of multilateral
trade negotiations under the GATT. In that way, past section 337
policies can be taken into account in the negotiations and future
section 337 policy conditioned in the sense that it can be made to
take account of the acts resulting from the negotiations. The ITC
is an appropriate technical consultant to the United States
delegation.
Such arrangements are not unheard of. The Civil Aeronautics
Board which as we have mentioned earlier is responsible for the
implementation of economic policies respecting foreign air
transportation and has been invited to provide technical assist-
ance to U.S. delegations. 65 Indeed, to a limited extent, the
Commission has done so in the past.66
65. See supra note 23.
Under the Civil Aeronautics Act [which has since been replaced by similar
provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 19581, the CAB is the agency of
Government vested with the responsibility to develop an air transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future need of the foreign
commerce of the United States. This requires the Board to assert fully its
-responsibility as the principal aviation adviser to the executive branch of the
Government on international air agreements.
See SEN. REP. No. 1875, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1956), for a list of recommenda-
tions. This report describes a system that involved "a serious tug-of-war between
the State Department and the CAB as to just which agency is the dominate [sic]
one in these negotiations." Id. at 28. It is common knowledge that today the CAB
actively participates in the delegations which negotiate bilateral air agreements as
the model of the so-called Bermuda Agreement, T.I.A.S. No. 1507 (1946). These
agreements, as GAT, are executive agreements. Moreover, since the Bermuda
Agreement model includes "'[quoting the State Department] the basic American
philosophy of regulated competition in the public interest'," issues of unfair
practices arising from cartelization, division of markets, and so on, are or may be
subjects upon which the Board may have to take a position in these negotiations.
Id. at 3. These principles are, indeed, now a part of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
66. See Hearings on the International Antidumping Code Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1968) (testimony of Rep. William M.
Roth).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Section 337 offers a broad instrument for effecting a policy of
free competition in the import trade of the United States, but the
history of the antecedents of the present law, which were
essentially decisions to bring the statute into disuse, are not, in
our opinion, a useful vehicle for realizing this potential. This is the
case with the Robinson-Patman Act as well. Several constructive,
although somewhat complex, options lie along the lines of
interpretive rules and greater Commission participation in the
negotiation of international agreement affecting competition in
imports.
